TOSHIBA COLOR TV MODEL N. C2295T1 YEAR 1980.

The TOSHIBA COLOR TV MODEL N. C2295T1 is a 25 inches (59cm) color television with 16 programs and remote with Rotatable tuning search electronically AFC assisted and Static program memory.
The general concept of Automatic Frequency Control (AFC) for television receivers is known in the art and has been adapted to radio receivers as well as to television receivers of both the monochrome and color variety. The general purpose of such a system is to assist the user in attaining proper fine-tuning of the receiver without requiring critical manual adjustment. The advantage of such a system is self-evident but its value to a color receiver is markedly increased due to the fact that improper tuning of a color receiver manifests itself in incorrect colors, or even a total lack of color, in the reproduced image. Typically, the AFC system is tuned to a reference or center frequency corresponding to the desired video IF frequency and so long as the tuning is reasonably close, within the response of the AFC system, an error voltage is developed to correct the tuning. If the user of the television receiver makes the fine-tuning adjustment while the AFC system is operative, he may adjust it to a point where the picture is acceptable but a substantial amount of AFC correction voltage is required. Thus, the receiver may be tuned at the limit of the "hold-in" range and would not give the proper "pull-in" performance when the channel selector is switched to the next channel. Accordingly, it is desirable to include an AFC defeat circuit for disabling the AFC system during manual fine-tuning. Heretofore, most AFC defeat circuits have required that the user of the television receiver defeat the AFC system by means of a manual switch. It is apparent, however, that the typical user of a television receiver may at times forget to flip the switch and hence the attendant problems are realized.
Additionally the set has a VU meter to provide some form of visual indicating apparatus whereby an operator is aware of the approximate tuning of the receiver. Obviously, the provision of such visual indicating apparatus at a minimum cost of materials and labor is of utmost importance.

A signal receiver having VHF and UHF varactor tuners and a channel indicating group for the upper and lower VHF channels and for the UHF channel includes band switching circuitry for selectively coupling a plurality of power sources to the tuners in accordance with activation of a particular channel indicating group. Also, the band switching circuitry is utilized in conjunction with a channel indicating meter circuit for providing a visual indication of the channel selected in each one of the channel indicating groups. SEE PICTURES.

The set has timer programming feature of the start of the television , which allows to start the tellye at a prefixed time on a prefixed program,Thereafter a digital control clock automatically selects the pre-entered information at the appropriate times and provides a control signal which may be used to automatically select the identified channels to the exclusion of all others. Alternatively, the signal may be used to exclude the selected channel from selection manually.

It features the TOSHIBA BLACKSTRIPE CRT TUBE.



Toshiba Corporation (Kabushiki-gaisha Tōshiba) is a Japanese
multinational conglomerate corporation, headquartered in Tokyo, Japan. The company's main business is in infrastructure, consumer products, electronic devices and components.
Toshiba-made Semiconductors are among the Worldwide Top 20 Semiconductor Sales Leaders. In 2009, Toshiba was the world's fifth largest personal computer vendor, after Hewlett-Packard of the U.S., Dell of the U.S., Acer of Taiwan, and Lenovo of China.

Toshiba was founded by the merging of two companies in 1939.
One, Tanaka Seisakusho (Tanaka Engineering Works), was Japan's first manufacturer of telegraph equipment and was established by Hisashige Tanaka in 1875. . In 1904, its name was changed to Shibaura Seisakusho (Shibaura Engineering Works). Through the first part of the 20th century Shibaura Engineering Works became a major manufacturer of heavy electrical machinery as Japan modernized during the Meiji Era and became a world industrial power.
The second company, Hakunetsusha, was established in 1890 and was Japan's first producer of incandescent electric lamps. It diversified into the manufacture of other consumer products and in 1899 was renamed Tokyo Denki (Tokyo Electric).
The merger in 1939 of Shibaura Seisakusho and Tokyo Denki created a new company called Tokyo Shibaura Denki (Tokyo Shibaura Electric) (東京芝浦電気). It was soon nicknamed Toshiba, but it was not until 1978 that the company was officially renamed Toshiba Corporation.
The group expanded strongly, both by internal growth and by acquisitions, buying heavy engineering and primary industry firms in the 1940s and 1950s and then spinning off subsidiaries in the 1970s and beyond. Groups created include Toshiba EMI (1960), Toshiba International Corporation (1970's) Toshiba Electrical Equipment (1974), Toshiba Chemical (1974), Toshiba Lighting and Technology (1989), Toshiba America Information Systems (1989) and Toshiba Carrier Corporation (1999).
Toshiba is responsible for a number of Japanese firsts, including radar (1942), the TAC digital computer (1954), transistor television and microwave oven (1959), color video phone (1971), Japanese word processor (1978), MRI system (1982), laptop personal computer (1986), NAND EEPROM (1991), DVD (1995), the Libretto sub-notebook personal computer (1996) and HD DVD (2005).
In 1977, Toshiba merged with the Brazilian company Semp (Sociedade Eletromercantil Paulista), forming Semp Toshiba.
In 1987, Toshiba Machine, a subsidiary of Toshiba, was accused of illegally selling CNC milling machines used to produce very quiet submarine propellers to the Soviet Union in violation of the CoCom agreement, an international embargo on certain countries to COMECON countries. The Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal involved a subsidiary of Toshiba and the Norwegian company Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk. The incident strained relations between the United States and Japan, and resulted in the arrest and prosecution of two senior executives, as well as the imposition of sanctions on the company by both countries. The US had always relied on the fact that the Soviets had noisy boats, so technology that would make the USSR's submarines harder to detect created a significant threat to America's security. Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania said "What Toshiba and Kongsberg did was ransom the security of the United States for $517 million."
In 2001, Toshiba signed a contract with Orion Electric, one of the world's largest OEM consumer video electronic makers and suppliers, to manufacture and supply finished consumer TV and video products for Toshiba to meet the increasing demand for the North American market. The contract ended in 2008, ending 7 years of OEM production with Orion.
In December 2004, Toshiba quietly announced it would discontinue manufacturing traditional in-house cathode ray tube (CRT) televisions. In 2006, Toshiba terminated production of in-house plasma TVs. Toshiba quickly switched to Orion as the supplier and maker of Toshiba-branded CRT-based TVs and plasma TVs until 2007. To ensure its future competitiveness in the flat-panel digital television and display market, Toshiba has made a considerable investment in a new kind of display technology called SED.
Toshiba is a diversified manufacturer and marketer of electrical products, spanning information & communications equipment and systems, Internet-based solutions and services, electronic components and materials, power systems, industrial and social infrastructure systems, and household appliances.

JAPAN IS STRANGE

Strange how situations change. It seems not so long ago that Japan and its industries, particularly electronics, could do no wrong. They taught us how to make cars and TV sets properly. They invested heavily and came up with a seem- ingly endless stream of desirable, innova- tive products. Both outsiders and insiders could see no end to this success story. We were told, by more than one leading Japanese electronics industrialist, that the 21st century would be the Japanese one, when Japan became predominant industri- ally and culturally. For the last couple of years the situation has been somewhat different. Japan is still the world's second largest economy, but the previous confidence has gone. The econo- my has stalled, and doesn't look like getting going again for some time. Profitability has become appalling, and the talk now is all of restructuring and job losses. Sony has announced that some 17,000 jobs will be lost worldwide, ten per cent of its workforce, while fifteen of its seventy factories are to be closed. Mighty Hitachi, whose activities span a much wider field and whose turnover is equivalent to over two per cent of Japan's gross domestic product, has launched a detailed review of its businesses. 6,500 of its 66,000 parent company employees are to be made redun- dant by March next year. On a consolidat- ed basis Hitachi is Japan's largest employ- er, with 330,000 staff. Businesses are to be dropped or reorganised. The story from Mitsubishi Electric is similar: there is to be a "sweeping restructuring of its portfolio of businesses". In the UK, the latest manifes- tation of this is the closure of Mitsubishi's VCR plant at Livingston. 14,500 jobs will go (8,400 in Japan) at Mitsubishi Electric, nearly ten per cent of the workforce. Other manufacturers who have announced poor results and restructuring recently include NEC, Matsushita, Sharp and Toshiba. It's all a long way since the time when, it seemed, all the Japanese had to do was to get the product right and produce more and more of it. Some of this was foreseeable. Markets reach saturation point; new products are not always a runaway success; if investment in new plant is excessive you end up with too much capacity; and so on. Then there is the fact that Japan is not isolated from econom- ic problems elsewhere: no economy that is heavily dependent on exports can be. But there are also more specific Japanese prob- lems. The banking system is beset by non- performing loans that Japanese bankers are reluctant to write off. The bubble economy of a few years ago, when asset values rose to unrealistic levels, collapsed. This is part of the cause of the banking system difficul- ties. Then there is the practice of cross - ownership, with firms owning substantial stakes in each other. This can work nicely when everything is doing well: when reces- sion looms, it aggravates the problems. Japan's unemployment rate hit a new high of 4.8 per cent (3.39m) in March, part- ly because of the corporate sector restructur- ing. Japanese industrialists hope to improve their profitability in the second half of the year, and will be helped by improved condi- tions in SE Asia. But it will be hard going, particularly to improve domestic market conditions. The Japanese have always had a high propensity to save. This increases when the economic climate is poor, with unemployment a threat. Right now Japanese consumers are saving rather than buying. No one seems to know how to alter their behaviour. There is also a demographic problem: the Japanese population is ageing. Japanese interest rates are negligible. So borrowing is not a problem. But conversely all those savings are bringing in little income. In the Western world interest rate changes often have a considerable impact on the economy. This economic tool is not available when interest rates are negligible. The Japanese have been advised to get their banking system sorted out, but that's not the sort of thing that can be done overnight. Right now the best opportunity for Japan seems to be to export its way out of its dif- ficulties, something that shouldn't be too difficult once worldwide expansion has resumed. But the high value of the yen is a drawback. From the economic viewpoint it's an extremely interesting situation, one in which the laws of economics have little to offer. This could be because such laws are, basically, descriptive rather than prescrip- tive. In the real world you can't always ini- tiate economic activity through monetary or fiscal means. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the Japanese government should spend, spend, spend and print money to kick-start the economy. This is a dangerous course that can go badly wrong. It has already been tried by the Japanese government to a limited extent, with similarly limited success. The one thing that we do know is that economies are not stable. Change is ever present in one form or another. The prob- lem lies in trying to control it. This is all rather humbling, and certainly something of a comeuppance for the rather arrogant Japanese industrialists who had talked about the century of Japanese economic hegemony.

..................OLD RELIABILITY PROBLEM:

 It's a well known fact that the reliability of Japanese made TV sets is better than that of European made ones. It works out something like this: for every call to a Japanese set during its first year you'll have to make two -three calls to its European counterpart. It's not quite as bad as that may sound. Call rates tend to lie in the region 0.5-1, which means at one end that half the sets won't require attention while at the other end each set will require one call per year. Then again these are average figures, and while many sets won't require attention at all others will have more than their fair share of breakdowns. Fortunately there has been an improvement in recent years - the situation was rather worse say four years ago. But then for the last couple of years we've been going through a period when the technical situation has remained fairly static. Will the new in -line gun tube chassis using the new ranges of i.c.s prove more or less reliable than their immediate predecessors? Only time will tell of course. But the unfavourable comparison between the failure rate of Japanese and European sets has been a continuing fact of life for several years. Is it to do with components, assembly methods, or basic design? Well, Japanese sets use much the same components and assembly methods, and the designs are not fundamentally all that different. Perhaps there is some subtler difference somewhere? Recent conversations we've had suggest that this could well be so. We can speak only of the European industry of course, but feel that the situation is probably much the same with our continental competitors. The first thing to bear in mind - and this relates to other industries, such as car manufacturers, as well - is the different industrial structures. Like the car industry, European TV setmakers tend to be assemblers of finished products rather than manufacturers of whole units. They buy in capacitors, resistors, semiconductor devices, many of the wound components, the tubes, probably the tuners and triplers and so on. This is far less the case in Japan, where most of what a setmaker uses comes from "in house" sources. All right you may say. But European component manufacturers have been in the game long enough to know what they're about - as long as anyone else for that matter. Furthermore, they've been working in close contact with the same setmakers, both facing and dealing with common problems. Why should this different industrial set-up make any difference? It's probably not so much the set-up itself so much as the fact that the way the European industry is organised tends to emphasise certain basic weaknesses. Quite substantial changes have occurred in even the most mundane components in recent years - component manufacturers are producing new types of capacitor and resistor that were simply not known a decade ago for example. But to do this successfully calls for adequate investment and the employment of adequate numbers of properly trained engineers and technical staff. In both these respects, European industry is notorious. It may well be said that in difficult economic times it's hardly possible to increase investment and take on extra trained staff, which is true enough. But the fact is that we are reaping the results of our past inadequacies, and a start hag to be made sometime if the situation is ever to be retrieved. The main problems seem to relate to know-how and technical liaison. Does the setmaker get a thorough and reliable service from his suppliers - and conversely has he set about ensuring that he does? It's not good enough today to continue on the basis that something worked reasonably well enough last time and the supplier says he hasn't had any particular complaints other than the usual ones. To achieve the degree of reliability required to continue to exist in a highly competitive international industrial climate, it's necessary to know precisely what order of tolerances under various operating conditions the various components offered and bought have. And this calls for adequate technical back-up and investment. The Japanese invest adequately and their engineers can get together within a single organisation to deal with common problems. It's not necessary for the European industry to be reorganised for the same to be done. What's required is a more powerful voice for the engineer, backed by adequate investment.

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